The problem of democracy in the ASEAN Creative City: the cases of Chiang Mai, Bandung, Cebu, and George Town

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Abstract

The ‘Creative City’ is a global policy trend that has, evidently, been adopted by many cities around the world. At the beginning of the putative post-industrial era (early-1970s) major cities across the Europe and USA faced significant economic and social transition, specifically when their economic core was progressively hollowed out as industrial production migrated to Asia or to other, cheaper, regions. There were demonstrable urban impacts of this transition, including poverty, crime, and a generalised underdevelopment. The Creative City discourse dates to this period in the UK, when cultural consultants like Charles Landry and Franco Bianchini recognised the conditions of urban change and the potential role of culture as a framework for policy intervention. They proposed new strategic approaches, which evolved and became influential within international policy spheres — British Council, UNESCO, and regional networks, such as ASEAN. In the Southeast Asian region, the Creative City discourse was welcomed by the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a significant number of the major cities of the associated ten countries are currently using the Creative City as a model or framework for economic growth, social progress and cultural development (and as a broader means of internationalisation, cultural diplomacy and benefitting from UN-level development framework participation). This paper serves to consider the specific strategic manifestations of the Creative City idea and investigate its policy and ideological function in specific exemplar ASEAN cities.

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**Introduction: the geo-political framework**

In April 2017, ASEAN held the first ASEAN Creative Cities Forum and Exhibition in Manila (Philippines) as a part of ASEAN 2017 Business Event. It was convened to discuss the use of culture and creativity as a driving force of sustainable development (principally through urban regeneration and infrastructure development, growth and innovation, but also ASEAN’s socio-political aims of promoting social cohesion, citizen well-being and inter-cultural dialogue. Key parties already interested in the policy areas of Creative Economy were present, and through presentations and networking they shared their experiences and initiatives. How then did ASEAN actors adopt the Creative City as a development model for the region, and meet the expectations of the general political consensus on sustainable and inclusive development? Though ASEAN members (and not all) have just started using the Creative City discourse formally, some ASEAN cities have made huge progress. This paper looks at four exemplar cities: Chiang Mai (Thailand), Bandung (Indonesia), Cebu (Philippines), and George Town (Malaysia). These four cities formed a network within ASEAN in 2014 called the Southeast Asian Creative Cities Network (SEACCN), aiming to become the platform for policy development in the region.

The argument of this article is that the Creative City has become a ‘fast’ policy for ASEAN, regarded as a user-friendly tool for other, non-creative, policy aims. The fact remains, however, that cities are socially complex, and different, and so pertinent to this situation is the many scholars who have assessed the travel of such Western policy notions, (as ‘fast policy’ (Peck, 2005), ‘Xerox’ approach (Pratt, 2009), ‘cookie-cutter’ (Oakley, 2004), and so on). As a phenomenon of the now well-researched broader policy ‘transfer’ process, the Creative City has paradoxically been deployed without a thorough approach to culture itself — to a cultural audit of local assets, to cultural infrastructure, participants and producers, facilities and funding, and so on; and so this raises the suspicion that it has been co-opted as another policy instrument in the spectrum of urban economy development tools, hollowing out its actual purpose (and thus ultimate efficacy as a policy for culture). This article thus asks if the Creative City discourse has become a veritable Trojan Horse of neoliberalism in ASEAN, and in converting culture to economics, there are consequences. These consequences typify the implications of withdrawing or exploiting ‘culture’ in any society — that the development of democracy and civil society (of public life broadly) will be adversely impacted. Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) framework of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’ is useful in providing a range of specific criteria for the veritable ‘neoliberalisation’ of culture and society, specifically as facilitated by urban policies. This article’s purpose is to assess neoliberalism as a process in four ASEAN cities and determine whether a substantive interconnection (not necessarily causal) can be posited between neoliberal processes and the features of urban life as they have emerged within the Creative City context. This is then discussed in the context of democracy and democratisation, or the general horizon of political expectation in each of these cities’ host countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia) as each national government does progressively confirm (and purport to conform) to the normative international principles of social and well as economic sustainability as defined by the United Nations.

The research literature formative of the Creative City discourse is broad and cannot be summarised here. Nonetheless, Charles Landry’s *The Creative City: A toolkit for urban innovators* (2000, 2008) must be cited as a seminal reference point. Landry (2000), argued that creativity was a necessary framework for post-industrial urban development, and, like his younger American counter-part Richard Florida, knowledge, problem-solving, education, information and new technology were central. However, both Landry and Florida (the former arguably more than the latter) posited social and ‘human’ development as central to urban and city development (i.e. economic development more broadly).

For Florida, his controversial notion of the creative class has a high impact on the Creative City notion as he argues that the creative people are drawn to places with certain characteristics which he terms ‘the 3T’s’, which includes technology, talent, and...
tolerance. With this, Florida (2002) argues that place has become crucial than ever as it enables (i) the clustering of creative industries, and (ii) the densification of creative people. When firms cluster, it provides the positive benefits of co-location or ‘spillovers’ (Florida, 2005, p.29); and creative industries, more than most, require face-to-face contact and a diversity of individual talents (Florida, 2008). Both Landry (2008) and Florida (2002, 2005, 2008) maintain that such are now essential for post-industrial economic growth, which is centred in cities, and cities are the most effective environments for individual ingenuity, development and collaboration. Landry’s (2008) concept ‘creative milieu’, while largely untheorised, is effective in representing the social conditions for urban culture of creativity (why some cities are stimulating places of possibility, and others are not or are even the opposite).

Why Asia?
The emergence of the Creative City discourse in Asia was, in one sense, precipitated by one of the biggest crises in Asian history — the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In the 1990s, the government of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Philippines, gradually relaxed control over the domestic movement of capital in order to attract foreign direct investment (Steger and Roy, 2010). However, as the latter half of the 1990s turned, the fluidity of capital and its motivation by transnational capital interests, was brought home when Thailand was hit by currency speculators and the value of the Baht (and its annual growth rate) fell so dramatically, social consequences were experienced at every level (from education to medical care). Soon after fell other Asian economies, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and while many of these rebounded on the strength of their manufacturing, cheap labour costs, and exports, an economic ‘growth’ rationale became pervasive across the political spectrum, Left and Right. However, they also absorbed the emerging consensus (cf. UN-Habitat and its role in the Sustainable Development Goal No.11) that cities are becoming the principal drivers of economic growth. And while a traditional industrial base of agriculture, manufacturing and natural resources, predominate in each ASEAN country, they each became open to Western market-based innovations, such as the use of new technologies, and the spillover effects of small-scale innovative firms, cultural heritage and tourism, and, specifically, the ‘creative industries’. The four case studies in this article considers this latter adaptation.

Each of these cases is based on primary empirical research. For each city, desk research was conducted on the socio-economic history of the city, under what economic conditions each city has adopted and adapted the Creative City paradigm, and what rationales, developments and policy-facilitated actions have emerged. Information has been garnered from various news, government and investment agencies’ websites, official publications (of government and its agencies, or public institutions), and secondary sources such as academic journal articles. These sources were assessed within a narrative critique on the evolution of neoliberalism, to explain and link the urban changes that cohere with Creative City paradigm. The research material was adapted to a tabulation of neoliberal impacts — that is, from the aforementioned article ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’ by Brenner and Theodore (2002). This allowed the argument a trajectory, in terms of the ways Creative City urban development proceeded in relation to each of the countries’ political orientation in developing its civil society and democracy.

(1): Chiang Mai and participation
Banyan (2007) states that “The concept of participation implies involvement in public decisions, as distinguished from other forms of community involvement. Public decisions are those in which the entire community has a stake in the outcome” (p.2) The broad participatory mechanisms that would ensure the fairness, openness, competence and legitimacy in a democratised society are, classically, electoral participation, direct forms of participation, citizen-government interactions, group participation, and activism and dissent (ibid). Two mechanisms that are relevant to the Creative City discourse as it has become a policy framework in the Thai city of Chiang Mai are citizen-government interactions

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and group participation. The mechanism of group participation will be assessed first, as this relates to the central mechanism of the governance model of Chiang Mai’s creative city making operations. Group participation takes place when “individuals feed their preferences through an organisation or body that acts as a mediator to express their interests” (Banyan, 2007, p.4), and while group participation allows the representation of marginal or disadvantaged voices, this matter is less obvious and perhaps incurs a greater political risk.

There are three issues we need to take into account: “(i) Groups are not equally accountable to all citizens but primarily respond to their own constituencies, (ii) groups are not necessarily guided by ‘community’ principles, and (iii) not all community interests are represented by groups” (Banyan, 2007, p.4). These are taken as assumptions in our assessment on citizen-government interaction in Chiang Mai. We assume that in order to ensure citizen representation, the government must interact with citizens in some specific capacity, notably in ways that inform the making and implementation stages of policy. This might be public meetings, hearings, citizen surveys, consensus-building processes, or any other method that de facto defines citizens as a ‘public’ with rights and interests and involve these in the making of political decisions pertaining to the sphere of those interests (Banyan, 2007, p.3). The criteria of assessment by which participation in the Chiang Mai Creative City will be conducted will be drawn from the above. The first criterion is the visible inclusion of the public interest — how this is involved in important urban decisions concerning the city’s culture (i.e. the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, the UNESCO World Heritage Site Status). The second criterion is citizen-involvement — whether priorities, processes and procedures pertain to the policymaking and implementation stages (such as consultations, hearings or surveys). These criteria are basic with regard to our concept of democracy, and obviously, do not attempt to ascertain the extent or depth of democracy or democratisation that the Creative City framework might cultivate. It will, however, offer a conceptual framework to identify the integrity of democracy in cultural policymaking by assessing the extent of public participation in Chiang Mai.

Participation and the Creative City
From the outset, the Creative City discourse has awarded significance to ‘participation’ broadly (both culture and social) — implied in the repeated ‘collaborative’ dimensions of city-development as lauded by the Creative City’s key theoretical architects – Charles Landry, Richard Florida, and John Howkins. However, ‘participation’, which essentially a concept traditional to liberal democracy, is also articulated in broad cultural and social terms that do not necessarily require processes of democracy or the institutional apparatus we may expect of democratic societies.

In Landry, Green, Matarasso, and Bianchini’s The Art of Regeneration: urban renewal through cultural activity (1996), we find a typical example of an emphasis on the supposedly clear benefits of participation in the form of participatory arts programmes. Argued is the point that participation offers “a route to personal development which suits how people learn about communication, personal effectiveness and self-reliance, and have shown their attraction for those who have found conventional education opportunities inappropriate” (Landry et al., 1996, p.31). As a general statement then, participation enhances social cohesion, improves the perception of the local area, reduces behaviour inimical to social cohesion, develop self-confidence in citizens, promotes an interest in maintaining the local environment, and further, a culture of collaboration emerges in the form of sectoral partnerships, organisational capacity, and a clear vision of what is possible in terms of actual future development (Landry et al., 1996, p.31-33).

Landry’s expanded re-issue of the seminal statement The Creative City (2000) tends to ‘frame’ these assertions with a form of Human Development, whereby the most critical resource a city possesses is its ‘people’, in terms of “Human cleverness, desires, motivations, imagination and creativity”, which are gradually “replacing location, natural resources and market access” as ‘urban resources’ — for, “The creativity of those who live in and run cities will determine future success” (Landry, 2000, p.51).
Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ thesis, noted above, obvious proposes the emergence of a new category of social class, his theory of industrial development does prioritise people in terms of their individual aptitudes, capabilities and aspirations. Moreover, while many have framed Florida’s creative class in terms of free-market neoliberalism (Peck, 2005, etc.), he nonetheless maintained an emphatic series of claims on the necessity of certain social and urban conditions. In his latest popular book, *The New Urban Crisis: gentrification, housing bubbles, growing inequality, and what we can do about it* (2017, p.xxi), Florida returns to these conditions and indicates that the “enduring success in the new people-driven, place-based economy turned on doing the smaller things that made cities great places to live and work — things like making sure there were walkable, pedestrian-friendly streets, bike lanes, parks, exciting art and music scenes, and vibrant areas where people could gather in cafés and restaurants.” He continues, “Cities needed more than a competitive business climate; they also needed a great people climate…” (Florida, 2017, p.xxi). While the social and urban conditions of human creative flourishing were always embedded in his theory, the term ‘people climate’ was quite new and quite untheorised.

As for John Howkins’ theorisation of the Creative Economy, he does make significant mention of the effect of the new economic change in people’s lives, including workplace, homes, and cities (Howkins, 2001, p.viii-xiv). And insofar as the creative economy is an urban phenomenon, Howkins states that the heart of the creative transformation of industry is a general determination for people to want to think of new ideas that stimulate others, and this could not happen without an industrial-urban economy that facilitated optimum participation, and a consequent shaping power in cities (Howkins, 2001, p.ix).

Thus, Landry, Florida and Howkins together indicate a widespread assumption on participation, in its cultural, social and urban senses. Consequently, the ‘fast’ policy of creative city-making has assumed rhetoric of participation embedded within it, which, by implication involves normative democratic expectations on the role of citizens (not simply consumers) in shaping their social environment of habitation and work.

**Participation in Chiang Mai Creative City**

In Chiang Mai, we find three organisations central to the Creative City policy project: Creative Chiang Mai, Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art, and Thailand Creative and Design Centre (TCDC). Creative Chiang Mai was the first organisation to advocate the Creative City policy concept in the city and to work with the Chiang Mai University Science and Technology Park; their advocacy emphasises innovation and technology. Their industrial framework is not simply a generic ‘creative industries’ but more specific ‘design industry’ as exemplified in the annual Chiang Mai Design Awards (CDA, established in 2012). Aiming to promote innovation and creativity together, the range of design categories the award demonstrates an attempt to maintain a specificity of purpose along with a recognition that ‘design’ as an ‘industry’ or ‘sector’ is actually hybrid and contains some very different professional areas (from graphic design to architecture). Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art is a network association whose central purpose was to support the application of Chiang Mai to membership of the UNESCO Creative Cities programme (awarded October 2017). The TCDC is supervised by the Royal Thai Government’s Office of Knowledge Management and Development, and founded in 2004 is a central think tank, advocacy and commissioning centre that is, again, spearheaded by the ‘design industry’.

**Governance and policy implementation**

A central dimension of participation is some measure of involvement of sector professionals or the general public in decision-making – organisational and policy-based. This section demands a comment on the concept of governance in Chiang Mai as it has been subject to the forces of neoliberalism along with the rest of the public or governmentally funded institutional sector (Bevir, 2007, p.364-380). Governance is a complex and fragmented pattern of rule composed of multiplying networks (ibid) – often institutions responsible for devolved powers. Our central research question is how, if at all, governance in the city is facilitated by the new
Creative City policy discourse? Is there reason to infer or assert that it has? The neoliberal narratives of free market, civil society, and corporate power, suggests that ‘governance’ itself is essential to a capitalist social order, central to whose concept of organisation is not, logically, collective cooperation but individual self-interested action directed on the basis of market norms and calculated cost-benefit ratios aiming for profit or at least utility maximisation (Bevir, 2007). Neoliberalism is characterised by marketisation and the ‘new public management’ (NPM) inculcation of corporate strategic management as a template for public institutions and/or social services (ibid). This section argues that the model of cultural governance in Chiang Mai, as exemplified by the Creative City policy development is organisational participation without citizen involvement.

The central agencies of governance in Chiang Mai’s Creative City are cited above. As Costa, Magalhães, Vasconcelos, and Sugahara note (2007, 2008), the UK’s Department of Culture, Media and Sports’ (DCMS) well-publicised definition of ‘creative industries’ and subsequent market-oriented development policies made an impact worldwide (Costa et al., 2007, p.127), and which continues through the British Council’s creative cities scheme as well as a multitude of national arts councils, Western consultancies and indigenous think tanks like Thailand’s TCDC. TCDC’s influence is national, Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk art is very much a local or at best regional influence, and Creative Chiang Mai is a city-based non-profit organisation. Costa, Magalhães, Vasconcelos and Sugahara (2008) propose three different axes of analysis for a study of governance: national versus local/regional, policy intervention versus the influence of non-policies, and public versus non-public projects (See Costa et al. 2008, 2009).

Costa, Magalhães, Vasconcelos and Sugahara argue that for creative city policies, the regional/local level of governance is most effective as it impacts dimensions of the urban economy not encompassed by national models of governance. The branch of TCDC in Chiang Mai is suggested as evidence of this: as interviewed, the director of the TCDC Chiang Mai stated that he recognises the distance between the organisations programme and the social life of the city (and, the character of the projects and identity of the city), and that was in part its strategic role as national government advocate (Buakeow, 2017). This further suggests that Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art’s and the Creative Chiang Mai projects lessen the sense of distance between cultural organisations and the social life of the city. As local organisations, projects run by these two actors are more connected to the social life of the city. The craft industry is a well-known industry in Chiang Mai. Creative Chiang Mai offers ‘handmade—chiangmai’ and ‘salahmade’ branded projects with online platforms to connect artisans and buyers. They present stories and procedures of artisans and craft products (handmade-chiangmai, 2019). This way, artisans are offered a more extensive network and connection, rather than just passing the middleman.

The axis of ‘policy intervention versus non-policies’ (that is, without explicit policymaking for the development of creativity in cities: Costa et al., 2008), all three Chiang Mai organisations bear some influence on the shaping and making of the city as a creative city through the force of their institutional presence, networked professionals, projects and creative outputs. Firstly, the Creative Chiang Mai influenced the Chiang Mai government to apply for the UNESCO Creative Cities Network. Presenting endless opportunities on the economy and urban development by using creativity as a driving force, Creative Chiang Mai has injected the creativity discourse into the urban scene. Not long after the failed application of Chiang Mai as a ‘design’ city to the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, the Chiang Mai government seized the opportunity to ‘re-invent’ the opportunity by appointing the Chiang Mai University’s Faculty of Fine Arts to work on the application for the UNESCO Creative Cities Network as a ‘crafts and folk art’ city. The city finally gained the title in 2017. Moreover, these creative organisations have influenced the use of creativity discourse in the city by hosting events that have impacted the city. The annual ‘Chiang Mai Design Week’ by the collaboration of these three organisations, private and government
sectors in Chiang Mai is a good example of how the creativity discourse has been spread in the city. It is a week-long event that showcases mainly crafts and design industry. Apart from regional and international audiences, people and the social life in Chiang Mai are influenced bit by bit by this event.

The last discussed axis, ‘public versus non-public projects’ can be qualified by the observation that “Besides...governance models mainly based on public projects, there are governance strategies that are the outcome of non-public will (even if they are in part publicly funded)” (Costa et al., 2007, 2008, p.409). These projects could be “the product of non-profit organisations such as associations, foundations or agencies funded with public and/or private money” (Costa et al. 2008, p.409). Furthermore, they maintain two spheres of organisational activity: (i) the promotion of a specific creative activity/genre or sub-sector of the creative industries; and (ii) the promotion of a geographic area (region, city, quarter, district, borough, and so on), often in terms of the diversity of creative activities and industries located therein. This governance model pertains to the Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art and Creative Chiang Mai, quite obviously. Both are promoting specific genres or professional areas of creative industry (the craft industry, the design industry) but these areas are defined as hybrid given the spectrum of activities in these categories within the bounds of the city. Also, both participate in the identity-enhancement and promotion of the city as a creative location. Therefore, Creative Chiang Mai and Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art can participate in city branding, whereas it appears to be harder for TCDC.

Policy implementation
Policy implementation is a critical stage within policymaking itself and not simply the ‘application’ of policy (Bardach, 1977). Implementation is so often where the policy becomes visible in the public realm, open to reflection, feedback or criticism, and if the policymaking process is subject to democratic accountability, review and assessment of outcomes will be essential to the continuity of implementation (whether to the refinement or amendment of policy, or of strategy or the programmes by which policy is activated, or amendment and change. A question emerges as to whom, and on behalf of whom (representation) implementation takes place. Who is involved? In the previous section, the second ‘axis’ of Costa et al. indicates that the governance model in Chiang Mai belongs to a ‘non-policies’ one, which makes it harder to ensure the involvement of citizens in the policy implementation stage. The dominant three Creative City organisations all claim to be acting on behalf of the people of the city, but this is simply a generalised notion that includes residents, visitors, workers (of all categories).

The example of the application to the UNESCO Creative Cities Network by the Chiang Mai local government in the previous section demonstrates how policy is made in the city. Buzz words or trends that have grabbed the local government’s attention make it into the urban policy of the city without much citizens participation. People participate in the policymaking of the city are those in the government, in organisations which include people in higher social status.

A further matter for the critical scrutiny of implementation is the ‘organisational field’ of creative organisations in the city. Do the organisations cooperate, and work in an interconnected or strategic way, or are they quite disconnected from each other? If the latter, then the potential for overlap, competition, cross-checking or collegiality may raise questions concerning efficiency and accountability in the public realm of the city. From the interviews, this has been proven by the three organisations themselves that they work quite separately in strategy and projects planning (Boonyasarat, 2017; Buakeow, 2017; Venzky-Stalling, 2017). In Chiang Mai, the implementation of the Creative City policy take place in ways that can be defined as both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’: TCDC Chiang Mai can be described as top-down, while Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art and Creative Chiang Mai happen bottom-up. Decision-makers in the former are national, whereby the regional city-based operations are implementations of national policy programmes (and effectively involve the only relation between central and local government).
Neoliberalism in the city
This paper argues that the adoption of the Creative City discourse in Chiang Mai is a Trojan horse of neoliberalism as it causes the problems of disempowerment, disenfranchisement, marginalisation, and inequality. Firstly, the governance model of Chiang Mai Creative City has facilitated an issue with disempowerment. Disempowerment leads to the lack of civil society where independent or entrepreneurial or social-based agencies or people are not given opportunities, resources and incentives that they should have been given. The creative industries and urban development in Chiang Mai are reserved for a limited number of specialist or stakeholder agencies. With no shared, representative, decision making or action that represents the whole city, people are not involved in the decision-making process as discussed in the previous section. It is evident that selected members of the three organisations are on the higher social class, for example, university lecturers, business people, politicians, government officers, and so on. Many of them are not resident in the city; however, the fact that Chiang Mai is a rapid growing secondary city of Thailand, this attracts these groups of people. Also, when this kind of policy discourse is pushed forward, it is difficult for locals to resist. Many creative and cultural clusters in Chiang Mai, for example, Bor Sarng, Baan Tawai, and Wat Gate, have been automatically included in the branding process that they have become commodified.

Secondly, the issue of disenfranchisement has sprung from the adoption of the Creative City discourse in Chiang Mai. The previous discussion shows that the adoption of the discourse and the process of policy implementation did not allow the public to be involved as much as they should. The ongoing discourse of the Creative City in the city makes some groups of people do not feel involved with the direction of the development in the city. Even though the projects from the three creative city organisations seem to be for locals, they do not base on community-based interaction or localisation. There is no mechanisms or schemes that enable the recognition of other city groups or create active involvement in creative city activities. The activities from the Chiang Mai City of Crafts and Folk Art mainly cater to the need of the craft industry. This works out the same for the Creative Chiang Mai and TCDC where their main targets have become the prioritised group of Chiang Mai’s urban development. This does not mean that the organisations should provide projects without specific groups of audiences, but the governance model of the creative city making does not provide a framework for identifying and contributing to the non-creative or destructive aspects of the city – like excluded people, young people in trouble, crime or drugs. People who do not feel involved become non-active members of the community, and this could lead to anti-social behaviours. The Creative City discourse, as a notion from the West, appears as alienated to locals as commented by the TCDC director, Buakeow (2017). People’s lifestyles are not taken into account; thus, the related projects had not been participated by a wider range of people of the city.

Thirdly, marginalisation is implied by the previous two issues. The problem of marginalisation can be viewed in two domains: social and cultural. Socially, the Creative City discourse in Chiang Mai creates cultural elites which reproduce a social hierarchy. People who are involved in the making of Chiang Mai as a creative city hold power and gain even more power through the process. Without a balance from local and central governments, the city has turned to be a place for certain groups of people – those who ‘belong’. These people are then placed on the top step of the social ladder. Even when local artists are involved in projects, they would not really belong in this reproduced social class or a so-called ‘creative class.’ Nimmanhaemin, the art cluster in Chiang Mai, is one of the examples of this social marginalisation. The area has been commodified that it has turned to be a place mainly for business purposes. Only established artists and big businesses survive in the area, and this has diminished other forms of arts and creativity as this place has turned out to be a place for specific groups and tourists. For cultural production, there will be a marginalisation of industries as the Creative City discourse limits the field of creativity to small niche areas of specialisation – not broad-based industrial development, where (a) creativity
can impact all areas of a city’s industry, (b) creative labour can be a training for transferable skills and employment prospects, and (c) where labour is interconnected with training and educational institutions. In Chiang Mai, the niche industries that are promoted are the craft industry and the design industry. People in these industries are developed to be fed into the industries. This creates a trap, as people do not grow and develop to their full potential. They are only supported to be a function in the machine of production. It is evident that areas in Chiang Mai have been unevenly developed through the use of creative city and creativity policies as guided by projects and developmental schemes such as the UNESCO Creative Cities and the UNESCO World Heritage Site. It is a facet of neoliberal ideology that convinces workers that they are privileged and one day will find prosperity through their creativity. All in all, these above problems above could ultimately emerge as a crisis of inequality (or at least, exacerbated inequality). With the reproduction of social class, niche markets, and lack of democratic process, inequality will emerge.

(2): Bandung and ‘city re-representation’?
City ‘re-representation’ is another central feature extrapolated from Brenner’s and Theodore’s (2002) criteria of neoliberal localisation. Re-representation is a discursive mechanism of neoliberal localisation, which like others, comprises moments of destruction and creation — the existing unfortunate or ineffective ‘image’ of a city (where, for example, actual economic realities of urban disorder both socially and economically) are emphatic, are replaced by characteristics more constructive of a new economic order and its ideologies. In Bandung, the entrepreneurial discourse has been mobilised to good effect, promoting policy rhetoric of revitalisation, reinvestment, and rejuvenation through creativity and industrial innovation. The concept ‘representation’ is recently, commonly deployed with critical urban analysis to identify three related processes (Castiglione, 2007). First, representation suggests the forms through which political action (or, for our purposes, policy implementation) takes place in the context of a ‘principal-agent’ relationship — where, for instance, a government can be said to act in the interests of its people (ibid). Second, representation identifies the place, or places, through which political power can be exercised responsibly and with a degree of accountability, thus enabling citizens to have both a degree of influence and some control over such power (ibid). Third, representation determines how political voice can be embodied with a certain degree of equality and recognition (ibid). These three processes suggest what a city should concern in terms of the re-representation of its image to ensure the equal representation of its citizens and protect their identities in the city and that their political power is exercised with a degree of accountability.

How cities are represented or represent themselves to themselves, or to others has been a matter of ongoing debate among urbanists. American professor Sharon Zukin forged a seminal line of criticism identifying how the representation of culture in cities is a powerful means of managing both cities and culture given how the latter is “a source of images and memories, it symbolises ‘who belongs’ in specific places” (Zukin, 1995, p.1). The Creative City discourse in Bandung has served in this way, with a form of a strategic brand for the city. Zukin further emphasised the “cultural power to create an image, to frame a vision, of the city has become more important as publics have become more mobile and diverse, and traditional institutions – both social classes and political parties – have become less relevant mechanisms of expressing identity” (1995, p.2-3).

Bandung’s city ‘re-representation’ begins with the work of the Bandung Creative City Forum (and its committees), who were tasked with forming a new ‘image’ for Bandung — in Zukin’s terms, as “Those who create images stamp a collective identity” (Zukin, 1995, p.3). This was in harmony with the noted discourse of entrepreneurialism, that was disseminated by both national and municipal economic policy, whereas neoliberal localisation, a more dynamic market model was progressively adopted. Brenner and Theodore (2002) discuss a variety of now common neoliberal policy innovations, including place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones,
urban development corporations, new forms of local ‘boosterism’, property-redevelopment schemes, and so on. These policies, on critical analysis, are not autonomous innovations but are calibrated within a suite of public policy measures to cohere with national and local economic policy and to effectively support the establishment of what can be identified as neoliberalism in regions undergoing urbanisation, particularly cities. Therefore, it will be taken into account as the second criterion with which we will define Bandung Creative City. This will necessitate attending to the role of (i) people in power and (ii) the role of entrepreneurial discourse itself.

City re-representation and the Creative City

Our central interlocutor, Charles Landry, awards a strong emphasis on the re-representation of the city in saying “Most of us agree that cities should have clear identities and a sense of community, that they should be distinctive and true to themselves” (2000, p.72). In order to make that happen, the values and norms of the cities’ diverse social or cultural groups must be recognised so as to develop a culture of actual ‘representation’ (in the political sense) and facilitate cultural sustainability, where people in cities are continually involved and responsible for the sustenance and productivity of the city (Landry, 2000). Landry and Bianchini together strengthen this general point in the ‘working paper 3 for Creative City’ indicators’ that “A city may, however, be made up of a range of identities, sometimes rooted in different parts of the city, that express themselves in different lifestyles and thus the tolerance alluded to earlier is a key aspect of harnessing these identities so that they contribute to overall viability and do not cause fragmentation” (1994, p.26). This emphasises the interconnection between culture and the equitable representation of diverse citizens in sustainable cities, and where identity and distinctiveness are both important in the process of selecting for the core and peripheral culture in the tide of available information and ideas (ibid). Moreover, they can also provide a bond between people with different backgrounds and interests to cooperate for the common good of the city; however, “when identity and distinctiveness degenerate into parochialism, introversion, chauvinism and antagonism to the outside world they may destroy the foundations of a creative milieu” (Landry and Bianchini, 1994, p.27) and this could have happened in the Bandung case when the Creative City discourse was adapted.

‘Representation’ in cities for Florida is internal to his characteristic “3T’s” of economic development: ‘technology, talent, and tolerance’ are necessary but, according to Florida (2008), not entirely sufficient for sustained economic growth. When discussing the locations that the creative class choose to live and work, he asserts that “Cities have personalities, too” and that “It is all well and good to know that place affects happiness, that the happiest communities tend to be open minded, vibrant places where people feel free to express themselves and cultivate their identities, and that these communities tend to foster creativity” (Florida, 2008, p.187). This projects the importance of a ‘positive’ representation to attract a certain group of people as he argues that creative people would choose a place in which to work and settle. This argument supports Landry’s and Bianchini’s view on the importance of identities in the making of a successful and sustainable creative city, and it can, therefore, be asserted that the aesthetics or visual “image” of a city’s work in representation must be interconnected with urban policy and the material conditions of social life.

Concerning the extent of the relationship between creativity and economics, Howkins also identifies environmental conditions, where “[Creativity] occurs whenever a person says, does or makes something that is new, either in the sense of ‘something from nothing’ or in the sense of giving a new character to something. Creativity occurs whether or not this process leads anywhere; it is present both in the thought and in the action” (Howkins, 2001, p.ix). The relation between ideas and actions and how the agents and agency of thought and action are socially situated reinforces Landry’s and Florida’s point on the re-representation of cities as not simply strategic brand or destination marketing but as internal to urban planning.
City representation in Bandung

Like most of the Southeast Asian cities, the development of Bandung started from agricultural activities. After 1945, Bandung was developed as an industrial area to support the growth of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The Master Plan of 1971 planned for Bandung to become a metropolitan centre at the regional level; at the local level, the city is divided into several functional zones and residential districts. The northern part of the city is used for administration, education and tourism-related uses; the central part with commerce, tourism and cultural uses; and the southern part with industrial uses. Later on, the new Master Plan 1985 included three levels of planning, which are the city, district, and technical level. In 1999, the municipal government of Bandung established a strategic vision for the city under the slogan ‘Greater Bandung 2020: Friendly and Smart.’

From this basic characterisation of urban policy rhetoric, it is obvious that the municipal government defines the new image of Bandung in terms of urban planning outcomes, albeit broad characteristics of an urban utopia with optimum industrial functionality.

The leading organisation for the creative city-building in Bandung is the Bandung Creative City Forum, established in 2008. Prior to that, the British Council had played an essential role in establishing entrepreneurial discourses in the city by introducing programmes such as the Indonesia Young Creative Entrepreneur (IYCE) and the Creative Entrepreneur Network (CEN). One of the awarded winners of the 2007 competition was Ridwan Kamil who later formed the Bandung Creative City Forum and was also elected as a mayor in 2013 and ran for governor in 2018, instead of seeking a second mayoral term. The influence of the British Council in the city of Bandung has set a trend of entrepreneurial discourses in the city. It became clearer with the establishment of Bandung in supporting this trend as the goals of the Bandung Creative City Forum are (i) promoting creativity, (ii) assisting in planning the improvements in city infrastructure as a means of supporting the development of the creative economy, and (iii) creating more creative entrepreneurs and communities. This has allegedly stamped the image for Bandung as urban projects and activities are done to support the goals of the organisation. When Ridwan stepped up as a mayor of the city, he gave an interview that he recognised the importance of the communities and he had tried to involve these communities in urban activities; however, the question remains, in Sharon Zukin’s terms, “Whose culture? Whose city?” (Zukin, 1995, p.1).

Looking at the branding for the city of Bandung under the brand ‘.bdg’ suggests the direction of the city re-representation. Brand .bdg emphasises on Bandung’s three central potentials: people, place and idea (as the Bandung Creative City Forum argues that people and ideas offer social innovation and economic values). Place and ideas offer active and entrepreneurial communities, and place and people offer a built environment with business potential (Larasati, 2014). Entrepreneurial discourses have been injected to the city’s brand; hence, the branding of Bandung under the Bandung Creative City Forum spreads the implication of individualism under the neoliberal ideology. This part has discussed the re-representation of the city from the city branding of the Bandung Creative City Forum. The next part will analyse emerging problems that happen from the re-representation process in Bandung.

What happened in Bandung?

When analysing the re-representation issue in the urban reality of Bandung, two main political issues emerge (i) people in power and (ii) the socio-political implications of the discourse of entrepreneurialism. To begin with, the establishment of the Bandung Creative City Forum happened with 50 independent members from across the creative industries’ spectrum — the arts, clothing, fashion, music, urbanists, archivists, solicitors, engineers and many more. On the face of it, this allowed for the representation and recognition of the spectrum of communities of arts and culture in the city. However, the tacit branding of Bandung through an alliance of all the
institutional and official representatives of culture and creative industries is not necessarily as democratic as it seems: this small, select and quite specific professional grouping has created a tendency towards certain representations of value and social life. The development of Bandung’s urban culture through urban development programmes like Simpul Institute, Bandung Creative Centre, Helarafest, Creative Entrepreneur Network, Kampung Kreatif, and the brand .bdg, has suggested that the core values of Bandung’s cultural life are the values of those who belong to its institution-based and recognised discourses. Thus, according to our first criterion of analysis, there is an uneven representation of culture and the arts in the city, as people (professionals) with specific forms of institutional power are the central agents of creating a new image for Bandung, inevitably favouring their own groups; as Colomb (2012) explains, the transformation of cultural consumption practices involve “the possession of ‘subcultural capital’ signalises status in the form of ‘hipness’” (Colomb, 2012, p.142). This has triggered a constant renegotiation and exclusion of the boundaries of legitimate culture to include new, previously illegitimate art and cultural forms (like street art and graffiti) (Thornton, 1997).

Our second criterion concerns the discourse of entrepreneurship in the city — discourses as they are powerfully presented in Bandung in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ branding. The Bandung Creative City Forum itself acts as a soft branding for Bandung as the network focuses on the creative industries. Projects like the Creative Entrepreneur Network and the brand .bdg also reinforce the entrepreneurial discourses in the city. The use of brand, while now a predictable and accepted practice for cities and leisure resorts, nonetheless structures the urban expanse of the city as a single entity often commodified according to external market expectations, or internal economic aspirations. A city all too easily restructures a communication strategy that speaks on behalf of economic actors in a city and not the city’s citizenship itself — de facto treating its citizens as customers or even visitors. In terms of ‘hard’ branding, many projects in the city have supported the entrepreneurial discourses, including Simpul Institute, Bandung Creative Centre, and Kampung Kreatif. These spaces offer benefits for the artist community and people in the creative industries. In 2017, the Bandung Creative Centre was opened by the lead of Ridwan Kamil and the Bandung City Government. The building is located in the central area of the city, and it costs approximately Rp 50 billion or 2.5 million pounds. Zukin (1995) argues, in the case of hard branding, that the prioritisation of investment and choice are focused on particular aspects that may deliver the most income using a whole population’s taxes. This presents an issue on taxation when the poor pay most and receive least in return. Another hard branding strategy is the Kampung Kreatif or ‘creative village’ where villages in Bandung are branded under the entrepreneurial discourse. These villages have been turned into commodities aiming at cultural tourists as Peck (2005, p.745) argues that “creatives want edgy cities, edge cities.” Thus, when the Creative City approach was adopted, this mentality was automatically applied to the urban development plan. To conclude this section, the two criteria show that Bandung is at risk of facing neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism in Bandung

What happened in Bandung has suggested the neoliberal consequences that have occurred and could be presented in the city later as an effect of the way the city re-represents itself. These include the issues of gentrification, discrimination and hegemony. To begin with, gentrification is a common issue that happens typically along with the process of urban regeneration. It can be broadly defined as a socioeconomic process accompanying any land-use change from low to relatively high functional value (Hudalah et al., 2016). The early literature suggests the replacement of indigenous and working-class people by those of higher socioeconomic status (Glass, 1964). Later on, the concept has developed to include the process of reinvestment of space neglected by the market to generate profit (Clark, 2005), which, then, suggests the physical and symbolic types of gentrification. The Kampung Kreatif project is a clear example for both the physical and symbolic gentrification in Bandung. Villages around the city have been turned into a
place for tourists. This shows that gentrification symbolically limited class-based community in their spaces and under the control of the superior class as this concerned with the capitalist accumulation of wealth manifested in the market or middle-class-driven urban land transformation and its social implications in the form of marginalisation. One of the creative villages, Dago Pojok, has gone through the process by adopting the wall paintings project that has resulted in the attraction of visitors that enjoy the ‘painted slum’ as a tourist attraction. This increases the gap between the locals, city authorities, and people benefited from the Creative City discourse. Moreover, there are more examples regarding the physical gentrification process in Bandung which suggests the uneven geographical development of the city, for example, areas around the Bandung Creative Centre have been rebuilt for the creative class. This also happens around the streets surrounding universities’ campuses in Bandung, for instance, Ganesha, Tamansari and Dipati Ukur. The streets have changed significantly with the emergence of creative-based businesses.

Discrimination emerges in the process of hard branding of the city in Bandung. According to Evans (2001, 2003), hard branding strategy creates cultural icons that are generally acknowledged to attract decision-makers and cultural tourists to cities. On the face of it they appear to be of broad benefit as they offer a more attractive, safer and cleaner city. However, the resources are generally focused, involve particular versions of the city, are targeted at including and making a version of a city for a targeted sector of interested parties, rather than ‘the many’ (Pratt, 2011). This inevitable ‘positions’ people outside of the circle and creates a sense of ‘otherness.’ This process deals with selective storytelling that only a limited number of optimistic voices, images and representations will conflate in urban branding materials. The larger problem emerges when the crisis of cities become a taboo that is avoided mentioning in urban planning (Vanolo, 2015). Despite the initial initiative of solving urban problems, what the Creative City discourse could function as is the masking of the real crisis in the city. In Bandung, the issues of crime and poverty were self-evident, and it was a policy starting point that the Bandung Creative City Forum saw, and the Creative City discourse was envisaged in a way to address these urban issues; however, when established, the goals of the organisation have shifted, fitting more with economic benefits that the Creative City discourse could offer, the crime rate and poverty have not been explicitly mentioned by the group and city authorities since that stage. With the new branding framework and even more effectively with the hard branding of the Bandung Creative Centre as a centre of attention for the newcomers, the original engaged social vision of the project has been supplanted with a consumption hub.

The problems of gentrification and discrimination create a further problem of hegemony in Bandung. Evans (2003, p.417) argues that cultural flagships have created a form of “Karaoke architecture where it is not important how well you can sing, but that you can do it with verse and gusto.” Thus, the ‘Karaoke architecture’ would be more or less the same in these cities. Eye-catching buildings and the development of around the area, as well as the influx of chain stores, occur in many cities around the world, including Bandung. The example could be seen from Kampung Braga, a village in Bandung where the local government decided to work with private developer and investor to renovate the area to be more attractive for visitors and Bandung’s people. The indigenous people of Braga community, however, face the problem from the building of new apartments as these high-rise buildings cover their houses from sunlight and there was no representative from neither the government nor the developer that willing to make a dialogue with the community (Mirza, 2010). These new high-rise buildings have been a phenomenon that happens in many other places where the regeneration takes place, which has led to a homogenous architecture and structural economic adjustment policies. Funding has been diverted into rural development, like in the case of Kampung Braga, and this could be through crafts, heritage or tourism-based projects (Evans and Foord, 2000). In addition, Bandung has been awarded a UNESCO Creative City of Design in 2015. This has also been widely debated by scholars (Pratt, 2011; Rosi, 2014) that the UNESCO Creative Cities Network
membership has the tendency to work jointly with the cities in the network effectively; however, there always the potential for the accolade to be used only as a branding tool to attract investors and tourists. Rosi (2014) argues that the tendency to use the membership as an ideal branding tool has been so far extreme within the network. This could finally lead to the hegemonic branding of cities, presenting themselves as a commodity. This section concludes with the assertion that the re-representing of the city of Bandung is caught in the trap of neoliberalism albeit unintentionally.

(3): Cebu and inter-local policy transfer
Neoliberal localisation (Brenner and Theodore’s, 2002) as a framework serves to identify the issue of policy mobility. This is internal to inter-local policy transfer mechanisms in Cebu, which include moments of destruction in terms of the erosion of contextually-sensitive approaches to local policymaking, and the marginalisation of ‘home-grown’ solutions to localised market failures and governance failures; it involves moments of creation, with the diffusion of generic, prototypical approaches to ‘modernising’ reform among policymakers in search of quick fixes for local social problems (e.g. welfare-to-work programmes, place-marketing strategies, zero-tolerance crime policies, etc.) — it involves an imposition of decontextualised ‘best practice’ models upon local policy environments. These moments of destruction and creation could, then, be drawn as criteria to analyse the process of neoliberalisation in Cebu. These moments will be grouped into two main criteria: (i) the discarding of contextual and evidence-based local policymaking and (ii) the emergence of the ‘best practice’ model (so well publicised by UK public policymakers).

There is a rich literature on ‘policy transfer’ and the rise of policy mobility. In conventional political-science, the understandings of ‘policy transfer’ typically hypothesise an “existence of a relatively unstructured policy market within which producer-innovators and consumer-emulators engage in freely-chosen transactions, adopting policy products that maximise reform goals” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.169). In terms of border-crossing policies, the orthodox literature is predominantly concerned with ex post facto evaluations of ‘successful’ transfers, which are typically judged according to “surface similarities in policy designs, scripts, and rationales” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.169). Policymakers are maximisers in rational-choice presumptions in this orthodox literature and that there is a tendency for sound policies to drive out bad, in the process of optimising diffusion (ibid).

In contrast to the orthodox literature, the new generation of critical policy studies is more inclined to adopt sociological, anthropological or institutional frames to aid analysis. Peck and Theodore (2010) discuss this in five points. First, “policy formation and transformation are seen as a (socially) constructed processes, as fields of power” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.169). Policy transfer here plays a role more than just a process of transmitting best practices, but it is also seen as a field of adaptive connections that is structured by abiding power relations and shifting ideological alignments (ibid). Second, “policy actors are not conceptualised as lone learners, but as embodied members of epistemic, expert, and practice communities” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.170). These policymakers are complex actors whose identities linked to organisational and political fields. Third, “mobile policies rarely travel as complete ‘packages,’ they move in bits and pieces – as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesised models – and they, therefore ‘arrive’ not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation” (ibid). There is a constant process of ‘making up’ policies in this environment of increased mobility as expertise is insourced from think tanks and consultancies, and so on. Fourth, “the resulting dynamic in the policymaking process is not one of simple emulation and linear replication across policymaking sites, but a more complex process of nonlinear reproduction” (ibid). Policies will, therefore, mutate and change during their journeys. Moreover, fifth, “the spatiality of policymaking is not flattened into some almost-featureless and inert plane or transaction space, marked only with jurisdictional boundaries, across which transfers occur, but in terms of a three-dimensional mosaic of increasingly reflexive forms of governance, shaped by multi-directional forms of cross-scalar and interlocal policy mobility”
(ibid). Hence, policies are not merely transiting, but evolving through mobility, while at the same time (re)making relational connections between policymaking sites. New forms of uneven spatial development and new localisations are continually being produced under such conditions (ibid).

Contrary to the orthodox literature on policy transfer, critical policy studies see policy transfer not as transit and transaction, but mobility and mutation (Peck and Theodore, 2010). Policies are not seen to be packaged for their journeys, they are mobilised and remaking the landscape they travel instead of just travelling across, and they are contributing to the interpenetration of distant policymaking sites. “In this sense, fields of policy mobility are themselves socially and institutionally constructed” (ibid, p.170).

Peck and Theodore’s five observation points can help to explain the neoliberal localisation of the Creative City discourse in conjunction with Brenner and Theodore’s mechanisms of neoliberal localisation in the last few decades. The formation of the Creative City approach is a socially constructed process and is related to power as policymakers are institutionally interconnected with actors and agencies in organisational and political fields. In addition, even though it seems like the Creative City approach is a policy package, it travels across new urban landscapes subject to process of selectivity. Cities only take what works, or rather, benefits their already formulated interests, or as Peck and Theodore (2010) discuss, is pertinent to the constant process of ‘making up’ policies, and under such condition that the Creative City discourse has created uneven spatial development.

Relevant to this, scholars (Larner and Laurie, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2010; Peck and Theodore, 2010) have discussed how practical programming knowledge and street-level expertise, like the Creative City approach, have assumed more considerable significance in policymaking processes. First, multilateral agencies, like the World Bank, are paying increased attention to practitioner expertise by enabling new forms of networking among ‘middle managers.’ Second, there are new arenas for policy exchange, such as international conferences and consultancies. Third, the ideological emphasis on ‘what works,’ as implied in UK’s ‘Third Way’ discourse and post-financial crisis pragmatism, makes practical experience symbolically privileged than theoretical knowledge. Finally, “a deepening reliance on technocratic forms of policy development and delivery is a widely observed feature of late-neoliberalism” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.172). This explains why a practical ‘toolkit’ like the Creative City has gone viral in the last few decades.

In this part, Cebu will be scrutinised on the issue of policy mobility by considering two main criteria of (i) the discarding of contextual and evidence-based local policymaking, and (ii) the emergence of the ‘best practice’ model. Starting from the theoretical debate on the Creative City discourse and the issue of policy mobility, arguments from Landry (2000), Florida (2002), and Howkins (2001) will be examined, followed by Cebu’s policy transfer process, its urban realities, and the consequences.

**Theoretical debate**

According to Landry and Bianchini’s (1995, p.5) pioneering work on the Creative City, many older theorists, like Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford or Jane Jacobs, offered important ideas by emphasising not only how a city might be shaped physically but also what could improve the lived experience for people. Landry and Bianchini (1995) acknowledged the importance of this train of scholarly thought, particularly on urban psychology; however, they emphasise how urban psychology is often used literally by urban planners. By adapting urban design the preconceived psychology of certain segments of the population might appeal to the concept of ‘creative milieu’ (the conditions of interaction and participation) but demographically separates certain types of citizen. Landry and Bianchini (1995) argue that this social impact tends to depend on the capacity of a policy programme to build partnerships, by bringing institutions like universities together with local firms to devise a broader-based creative environment for the city. Moreover, Landry and Bianchini (1995) add on the importance of ‘soft’ infrastructures to make people connect and experience a sense of
ownership of the place they live in, but failing to do so creates division, fear and alienation, minimal mobility for ‘others,’ and a diminishing sense of locality (Landry and Bianchini, 1995, p.7-8). Despite their intention to truly develop more sustainable environments for the people, the Creative City approach has been turned into just one of the ‘fast policy’ (Peck, 2005).

Florida (2012) argues that to build a genuinely creative milieu or industrious urban community – a ‘people climate’ is an essential aspect. Florida (2012, p.305) refers to the people climate as a general strategy that aims at attracting people, as well as retaining people, especially, but not limited to, creative people. Like Landry and Bianchini (1995), Florida (2002, 2012) suggests the use of university as a creative hub as he uses his ‘3 T’s’ to support that universities are centres for research in technology. They are also magnets for talents, and universities foster an open and tolerant people climate. In this sense, Florida (2012) stresses the importance of people, and he argues that there is no one-size-fits-all model for a successful people climate; however, his creative class thesis still comes with such attempts to harness a form of creativity that comes from buzzing and trendy neighbourhoods, and this kind of place is where it could attract the people climate – “a place where outsiders can quickly become insiders” (Florida, 2002, p.227). Therefore, despite the fact that Florida (2002, 2012) argues that there is no one-size-fits-all model to obtain the people climate, his explanation of a ‘suitable’ place is kind of suggesting that and in a way encouraging an inter-local policy transfer of the direct replication of the creative city script or as Pratt (2009) terms a ‘Xerox’ policymaking. In 2017, Florida’s new book The New Urban Crisis admits the problems that actually happen after almost two decades of the travelling of the creative class and creative city discourses, which are similar to what Landry and Bianchini (1995) predict. These urban crises include winner-take-all urbanism, city of elites, gentrification, inequality in cities, and so on.

Well over a decade ago, Howkins (2001) discussed how creativity needs to be fully recognised as a ‘creative capital’ as it results from investment and it is a substantial component of human capital and intellectual capital. He argues “Creative capital gains most when it is managed and made purposive. It flourishes best in small, flexible structures, which allow for the prevalence of full-time thinkers, the network office and the just-in-time worker. It needs rights management: to know when ideas can or should be turned into the property; the most cost-effective means of doing so; and the best way to exploit those rights” (Howkins, 2001, p.219). This implies that creative capital is a central asset for the creative economy and the creative city needs flexibility and contextual spaces when it is applied or used in an urban reality. Howkins (2001, p.220) emphasises that the raw material of the creative economy is the human talent of having new and original ideas that can be turned into economic capital and products; he adds, “A society that stifles or misuses its creative resources and signs up to the wrong property contract, cannot prosper. However, if we understand and manage this new creative economy, individuals will profit, and society will be rewarded” (Howkins, 2001, p.220). This argument is commensurate with Peck and Theodore’s (2010) assertion on policy mobility of how policies, as an exemplar, the Creative City approach could be conceptualised as a policy package or even worse, the ‘making up’ policy. What is required, however, is place-based policy, where culture is addressed as internal to the specific spectrum of interrelated social and economic conditions in a city, and the use of evidence-based local policymaking should be one of a range of policy approaches used to represent the social and material dimensions of life in the city (the lives of its citizens) and not an internationally emergent ‘best practice’ model.

Inter-local policy transfer in Cebu
In the Philippines, the development of creativity discourses of all kinds happened intensively at the national level. The Creative Economy concept became the main focus of the Philippine government after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The central government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the agency tasked with developing the Philippines’ creative economy, and the increased engagement of international partners like the British Council, consultancies like and the Tom Fleming Creative Consultancy (not
least, John Howkins himself) has played a significant role in the process of policy transfer and policy mobility in the Philippines. An inter-agency consultations programme was led by Tom Fleming Creative Consultancy. This programme involves many government agencies that play important roles in the planning process and development process of the creative industries in the Philippines. These government agencies are, namely, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the Design Centre of the Philippines (DCP), Intellectual Property Office Philippines (IPOPHIL), Department of Finance (DOF), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), National Museum of the Philippines and Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino (KWF), and other government representatives. It can be seen that these agencies are the actors in policymaking. As Peck and Theodore (2010) argue, think tanks and consultancies now are perceived as credible sources as practices and stories from other places are seen as valid sources.

What provoked the Creative City discourse in Cebu was the recognition of Cebu by the British Council as a Creative Capital of the Philippines in 2008, the occasion of which allowed the establishment of the Creative Cebu Council in 2009. The Creative Cebu Council sought to advocate creative entrepreneurship in Cebu and to develop Cebu as a creative entrepreneurship hub in the region. Here, the Creative City approach is perceived as the ‘best practice’ model, taking for granted the local home-grown solutions to the urban issues in Cebu. The urban reality of Cebu shows that the dominant group of people has the power to select things to apply to the city. Therefore, the Creative City idea does not happen from and within the people. The development of Cebu as a creative city geared towards niche groups such as artists, creative entrepreneurs, and investors, as these were obvious and most strategically effective. This was possibly one of the factors that the Creative Cebu Council did not last but closed in 2016 on account of its lack of effectiveness.

Another organisation that plays a part in the urban scene of Cebu is Create Cebu, interested in urban revitalisation and reclamation through art and collaboration. Its vision is to strengthen the Cebuano creative identity by building a more liveable Cebu where Cebuano history, identity, and culture of creation and open expression thrive and are visibly alive in the city (Create Cebu, 2014). These two different organisations work on the creative city scene in Cebu; however, it is undeniable that the inter-local policy transfer of the Creative City in Cebu is ignoring the evidence-based local policymaking by just jumping into the sugar-coated discourses.

Apart from these local agencies in Cebu, the national agency like the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) plays a part in the making of the creative city. The DTI Cebu primarily works towards global competitiveness and industry cluster management in the city. It can be seen that international, national and local agencies bombard Cebu with the ‘best practice’ model of the Creative City and the entrepreneurial discourse, and they have discarded the contextual and evidence-based local policymaking and solutions. Therefore, these urban realities fit the two criteria – 1) the discarding of contextual and evidence-based local policymaking and 2) the emergence of the ‘best practice’ model – that suggests the neoliberal localisation process at work in Cebu.

The involvement of the British Council has offered creative enterprise training, interagency consultations on the development of the creative industries, a report on creative hubs in the Philippines, and preparation for participation in the ASEAN Creative Cities Forum and Exhibition. With these programmes, plans and strategies, creative and entrepreneurship discourses were injected into Philippine and Cebu. This is visible in the enterprise training where British Council partnered with the UK innovation think tank, NESTA, whose training in Manila and Cebu were ‘replicated’ in other cities. At the ASEAN Creative Cities Forum and Exhibition itself (as noted, in Manila on April 2017), the British Council played a role with workshops and talks by UK experts. But, as Andy Pratt argues “Who would not want their city to be scientifically ranked as the ‘coolest’ on earth: the most creative city? It makes the residents feel good, politicians feel even better, and makes outsiders envious: so much so that they might even visit” (Pratt, 2008, p.5).
Neoliberal localisation

The consequences of the Creative City discourse in Cebu can be seen in terms of two critical issues: a zero-sum competition and the diminishing sense of community. In response to the deindustrialisation in cities in the 1980s, Harvey (1989) calls attention to the rise of ‘entrepreneurial’ urban strategies that have been normalised in the urban development discourse. Confronted by minimal options, cities threw themselves into a series of zero-sum competitions for mobile public and private investments (Peck, 2005). The phenomenon of this inter-urban competition was not only to attract jobs and mobile corporations but also to place cities in the spatial division of consumption (ibid), risking a chance of a zero-sum game in the urban landscape. Instead of the promising usage of art and culture in the truly developed urban economy, creativity strategies do the opposite (Peck, 2005). The strategies commodify the arts and cultural resources as economic assets, enabling the formation of new governance structures and local political channels, and enable the script of urban competition to be performed in eye-catching ways (ibid). Florida (2017), later, recognises the problems’ winner-take-all urbanism’ and ‘city of elites’ in his new book as the urban crisis. Peck (2005, p.764) criticises that “Creative-city strategies are predicated on, and designed for, this neoliberalised terrain. Repackaging urban cultural artefacts as competitive assets, they value them (literally) not for their own sake, but in terms of their (supposed) economic utility,” and most of the time, this process is led by a circulating class of gentrifiers, “whose lack of commitment to place and whose weak community ties are perversely celebrated.”

The arguments above present the urban issues in Cebu more vividly. The ‘fast urban policy’ (Peck, 2005), directed from the government and influenced by multilateral agencies, like the British Council, makes the city of Cebu faced with an unintentional inter-urban competition, resulting in the wider gap of the rich and the poor, a property-led development dominated by production of high-end residential real estate commodities, the rise of a speculative land market, and a highly regressive spatial allocation in the secondary metropolis of the developing country. For example, in 2011, the newly established Metro Cebu Development Coordinating Board (MCDCB) along with its allied private sector groups launched the ambitious Mega Cebu Project, a 30-year master plan for building a globally-competitive mega-region. Since the ‘Ceboom’ phenomenon in the 1990s, investment-oriented development has transformed Cebu City’s urban space and expanded its development tendrils into surrounding areas. Not only physically, but the coming of these market-driven developments has also changed the political and economic logic of Cebu’s urban trajectories (Ortega, 2012) “in the name of pushing Cebu forward in the international map” (Mozo, 2012). These fast-urban policies, including the adopted Creative City approach, reveal the lack of a link between these flagship projects and the people of the Cebu city, leading to the issue of ‘social trap,’ where a group of people is more interested in their own short-term individual gains and that they could be ignoring the long-term interests of the rest of the people in the city.

Following the problem of social trap from the zero-sum competition, the diminishing sense of community is an upcoming urban issue in Cebu. Harvey (1989, p.9) argues that “Above all, the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative and safe place to live or visit, to play and consume in” as art, culture and creative activities have been increasingly viewed as ‘symbols of a dynamic community.’ The lure illusion of a dynamic community is what makes creative strategies dangerous as it is portrayed as a shiny picture to cover the negative impacts that could happen, in this case – the diminishing sense of community. Sense of community has long been a concept of central importance in psychological and sociological theories about the impacts of living in an urban society. McMillan and Chavis (1986, p.9) define a sense of community as “a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met through their commitment to being together.” Moreover, a sense of community is related to positive social outcomes, such as
increased neighbouring and community participation (Chavis and Wandersman, 1990; Unger and Wandersman, 1982, 1985). In addition, the effects of urbanisation really reflected ‘drift’ and self-selection of low-status groups into inner-city areas (Gans, 1962, 1967; Hawley, 1972; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). This reflects in the case of Cebu when the national government encourages the global competitiveness narratives in the city. Local identities are put aside. The establishment of creative agencies in Cebu, the Creative Cebu Council and the Create Cebu, also only aims at particular groups of people, usually people involved in the creative industries and some niche groups of people in Cebu. Therefore, the sense of community, where people feel belonged and want to participate in making their communities a better place to live in, has weakened.

In conclusion, the Creative City discourse in Cebu led to the process of neoliberal localisation as analysed by the two criteria: 1) the discarding of contextual and evidence-based local policymaking and 2) the emergence of the ‘best practice’ model. The analysis shows that a zero-sum competition has happened in the city of Cebu regarding the housing market and the usage of space for certain groups of people in the society, especially the creative class, where the goal of being a globally competitive city is presented. This also leads to the diminishing sense of community that happened from the process of urbanisation both in the physical urban form and in social and political logic.

(4): George Town, gentrification and social diversity

The last section in this paper is the case of George Town in Penang, Malaysia. According to Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) criteria, the most apparent mechanism in George Town is the transformation of the built environment and urban form (as widely discussed in urban literature on gentrification). This mechanism consists of moments of destruction — the “elimination and/or intensified surveillance of urban public spaces, destruction of traditional working-class neighbourhoods in order to make way for speculative redevelopment, retreat from community-oriented planning initiatives”; the moments of creation were arguably the “creation of new privatised spaces of elite/corporate consumption, construction of large-scale megaprojects intended to attract corporate investment and reconfigure local land-use patterns, creation of gated communities, urban enclaves, and other ‘purified’ spaces of social reproduction, ‘rolling forward’ of the gentrification frontier and the intensification of socio-spatial polarisation, adoption of the principle of ‘highest and best use’ as the basis for major land-use planning decisions” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 371). These moments can be concluded as a process of gentrification. Ley makes a link between the Creative City discourse and gentrification as he argues “There has been movement from festivals to festival markets, from cultural production to cultural economies, to an intensified economic colonisation of the cultural realm, to the representation of the creative city not as a means of redemption but as a means of economic accumulation” (Ley, 2003, p. 2542).

Gentrification as a range of urbanisation processes was firstly defined in the 1960s by sociologist Ruth Glass, explaining London’s urban landscape that the working-class quarters had been replaced by the lower- and upper-middle-class (Glass, 1964). Cottages and Victorian houses had been upgraded to fit the needs of the middle classes. Glass (1964, p.xviii) argues that once the process of gentrification started in a district, it spreads rapidly “until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed.” Thirty-five years later in London, the 1999 decree for ‘Urban Renaissance’, released by a special Urban Task Force appointed by the UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, still echoed what Glass had captured then. In the context of North America and Europe, gentrification can be classified into three waves of gentrification (Hackworth, 2000).

The first wave, in the 1950s, was sporadic gentrification; the second wave in the 1970s and 1980s where gentrification became entwined with more extensive processes of urban and economic restructuring and was labelled the ‘anchoring phase’ of gentrification (Hackworth, 2000); the
third wave emerged in the 1990s and could be seen as the generalisation of gentrification (ibid). Unlike the first and second wave of gentrification, “Third-wave gentrification has evolved into a vehicle for transforming whole areas into new landscape complexes that pioneer a comprehensive class-inflected urban remake. These new landscape complexes now integrate housing with shopping, restaurants, cultural facilities, open space, employment opportunities – whole new complexes of recreation, consumption, production, and pleasure, as well as residence” (Smith, 2002, p.443). The generalisation of gentrification has various dimensions and has evolved into a crucial urban strategy for city governments around the world, mostly under the ‘urban regeneration’ discourse (Smith, 2002). “Enveloped as regeneration, gentrification is thus recast as a positive and necessary environmental strategy” (Smith, 2002, p.445). The debate for and against gentrification has regularly divided the opinions of policymakers and researchers. Positive and negative impacts of gentrification have been discussed widely by them. The positive impacts include stabilisation of declining areas, increased property values, reduced vacancy rates, increased local fiscal revenues, encouragement and increased viability of further development, reduction of suburban sprawl, increased social mix, decreased crime, and rehabilitation of property both with and without state sponsorship (Atkinson, 2004, p.112). There are also costs of gentrification, including community resentment and conflict, loss and affordable housing, unsustainable speculative property price increases, homelessness, more significant draw on local spending through lobbying by middle-class groups, commercial/industrial displacement, increased cost and changes to local services, loss of social diversity (from socially disparate to affluent ghettos), increased crime, under-occupancy and population loss to gentrified areas, displacement through rent/price increases, displacement and housing demand pressures on surrounding poor areas, and secondary psychological costs of displacement (Atkinson, 2004, p.112). In the long run, the negative impacts, however, seem to weigh out the urban benefits. In this section, therefore, the impacts of gentrification in George Town will be discussed in terms of gentrification as a global urban strategy and consummate expression of neoliberal urbanism.

The criteria of analysis for George Town is again Brenner and Theodore’s neoliberal localisation, in relation to the literature on gentrification. The visible route of gentrification is obviously the transformation of the built environment and urban form as it is oriented to a different social class: that is the first criterion. The second criterion involves regeneration projects in the city as, according to Smith (2002), most of the regeneration projects have the concealed processes of gentrification. Projects from Think City, the main actor on adopting the Creative City discourse, as well as federal government, will be cited.

Theoretical discussion
As noted above, Landry’s Creative City emphasises the importance of developing a ‘creative milieu’ as a means of creative urban transformation: “A creative milieu is a place – either a cluster of buildings, a part of a city, a city as a whole or a region – that contains the necessary preconditions in terms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure to generate a flow of ideas and inventions. Such a milieu is a physical setting where a critical mass of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, social activists, artists, administrators, power brokers or students can operate in an open-minded, cosmopolitan context and where face to face interaction creates new ideas, artefacts, products, services and institutions and as a consequence contributes to economic success.” Landry’s notion of the creative milieu morphs into a gentrification process, considering the sociological character of lifestyle in relation to social class. Café, clubs, bars, co-working space, and so on, attract certain forms of labour, taste, conduct and symbolic value. Despite the emphasis on the necessity of the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ infrastructure in relation to the qualities of a particular creative milieu, Landry develops no policy model, and cities all too often begin with established urban planning models and attempt to retro-fit the social into the infrastructural —ignoring the socio-psychological complexities of the ‘soft’ infrastructure hoping that the hard infrastructure would itself be a condition of generating a creative vibe and
attracting creative people. Landry (2008), however, defines soft infrastructure in terms of connections, values, networks, conditions, and attitudes, and these are not conceivably created through the formation or manipulation of hard infrastructure.

For Florida, the myths concerning the redundancy of physical places in an age of mobility and digital communication (Florida, 2005), are proved wrong in relation to contemporary cities like Austin and New York City. Physical place is a condition of clustering, agglomeration, face-to-face interaction, and all the positive benefits of co-location and ‘spillovers’ and so on. The question is, “Why do creative people cluster in certain places? In a world where people are highly mobile, why do they choose some cities over others and for what reasons?” His popular theory of the ‘3 T’s’ of economic growth is his response. To captivate the creative people, the city needs to have all three factors, and Florida (2005, p.37): he defines ‘tolerance’ as “openness, inclusiveness, and diversity to all ethnicities, races, and walks of life, ‘talent’ as “those with a bachelor’s degree or above,” and ‘technology’ as “a function of both innovation and high technology concentrations in a region.” Parallel with Landry’s notion of the ‘creative milieu’, policymakers are provokes into considering the social dimension of urban development.

In his chapter ‘managing creativity,’ Howkins (2001) discusses ten creative management principles or levers that affect the creative process. These are creative people, the job of thinker, the creative entrepreneur, the post-employment job, the just-in-time person, the temporary company, the network office and the business cluster, teamwork, finance, and deals and hits (Howkins, 2001). Importantly, the importance of the network office is symbolic in our discussion on gentrification: Harlan Cleveland (cited in Howkins, 2001, p.146), American Ambassador to NATO and President of the University of Hawaii, stated that the creative office is built “more around communities of people than communities of place,” and people need network spaces for socialising. Thus Howkins (2001, p.148) argues that “Clusters, where the mysteries become no mysteries’, provide mutual support psychologically, financially and technically... Any inputs from outside the cluster are quickly disseminated, and internal knowledge and skills do not leak out. Clusters can lead to a high rate of synergy, the positive interchange of complementary resources that creates a result that is more than the sum of its parts.” There are, however, different types of creative occupations and works. Howkins (2001) gives examples of writers, artists, and composers that need to work on their own much of the time. Therefore, managing isolation and managing networks are equally important, but in the context of the Creative City discourse, the process of converting these notions into urban policy remains uncertain.

George Town’s urban reality
Penang and its capital, George Town, have played a vital role in the Malaysian economy since the 1950s as a ‘free port’ in Malaysia. After losing its status in 1969, Penang held the first free trade zone (FTZ) in Malaysia, and from the 1970s onwards, there was emerging of the new economic era of manufacturing and industrial sector. From then, Penang has evolved into one of the largest global electronics manufacturing hubs and has been one of the world’s most successful stories of rapid industrialisation. From 2002, the Malaysian Government introduces the MM2H (Malaysia My Second Home) programme that allows foreigners that fit the criteria to relocate in Penang for ten years. However, similar to other industrial cities around the world, the manufacturing projects dropped down after its peak in 2008 due to the Major Multinational Corporations in Penang that have not established strong linkages with the domestic economy (Kraras et al., 2010), and like the global trend, these multinational companies then moved to other locations that offer lower costs of manufacturing. The impact that happened to George Town after the period of industrialisation is that there are many run-down buildings.

The nomination of George Town and Malacca as the UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 2008 came at a time when many projects to restore the city as a liveable place were already addressing the material, cultural, economic, and social conditions that attract talent and the required skilled workers. For George Town, it is the city’s cultural
diversity that was the critical component to secure the award as it is a multicultural society that has an original urban morphology, such as two-storey shophouse buildings. There are many projects concerning George Town urban development that sprang during that period from different actors. The state and federal government allotted an RM20 million to Khazanah Nasional to do conservation works of the heritage site in Malacca and George Town. ‘Think City’ was formed by the Khazanah Nasional to implement the George Town Grants Programme that was started in early 2010.

Through the Grants Programmes, Think City granted property owners who wanted to renovate their heritage buildings in the first phase to help to gain trust with various stakeholders. In the second phase, when locals could see the physical transformation in the city, Think City started to fund more community-oriented and intangible heritage initiatives. Also, in their third phase, they focused on shared spaces and projects that would bring people together. Despite the success that Think City claims, a paper on strategies for urban conservation by Malaysian scholars argues that “while there is strong support from the government and public interest groups, there is still no groundswell of support from the public in general to protect George Town’s urban heritage” (Lee et al., 2008, p.293). They argue that the indirect conservation by the government works well for the inner city of George Town as the Penang Island local government promoted development at the outskirts of the city centre to create more development in the previously underdeveloped areas (Lee et al., 2008). Fisher (2005) states that the move out of people to a new location can create high vacancy rates in the city centre and this would lead to the decline of the city centre. Lee et al. (2008) argue, however, that this works out perfectly for George Town in terms of buildings conservation. Nevertheless, this paper argues that although old buildings and shophouses are preserved, the cultural dynamics of the inner-city George Town have changed in an uncertain way. Ley’s (2003) study argues on the movement of districts from a position of high cultural capital and low economic capital to a position of steadily rising economic capital, which is similar to the case of rich cultural capital of the inner city George Town, by basing his argument on Bourdieu’s theoretical work on the ‘field of cultural production’. According to Ley (2003), Bourdieu’s (1993) work suggests the problem beyond only the displacement of class: “It problematises the positionality of these cohorts in terms of their possession of different (and in some respects oppositional) forms of capital, despite their common membership in the dominant class” (Ley, 2003, p.2541). In George Town, key actors, gentrifiers and facilitators are gaining more and more capital, while those outside their circle have less. By looking at the first criterion, the transformations of the built environment and urban form, it can be understood that there is a destruction of traditional working-class neighbourhoods in the inner city in order to make way for the higher-cost redevelopment. George Town’s vision was an ‘external’ one, conceived as an external viewpoint, and thus mostly appropriate for visitors.

Tourism development in George Town has been researched widely. The case of the rehabilitation and revitalisation of the Lebuh Acheen-Lebuh Armenian district will be the case in point as the area consists of many historic buildings. According to Kahn (1997, p.103), “It is planned that visitors to this cultural enclave will do more than gaze at buildings. An important feature of the plans is that the area will become a precinct in which tourist will interact more closely with, even directly consume, the objects of their gaze,” and that “Tourists will be encouraged to spend their money in proposed handicraft shops, restaurants, and hotels” to make heritage development an integral part of Penang’s ‘tourism product’ (New Straits Times, 1993).

The study on the stakeholders’ perceptions of George Town as a World Heritage Site shows that the majority of the respondents are aware of George Town’s status and think that such status would have a positive impact on local businesses, the conservation and restoration of heritage buildings, and the general well-being of George Town residents; however, many also think that tourism activities could harm George Town’s heritage site at the same time (Omar et al., 2013). Moreover, the study suggests that there is no
planning collaboration between the stakeholders and policymakers. Using the second criterion, the regeneration project in the Lebuh Acheen-Lebuh Armanian district suggests the process of gentrification has emerged as a ‘sugar-coated’ regeneration.

Consequences
What happened in George Town has resulted in neoliberal consequences – social reproduction and disintegrating developments. The sociologist Christopher Doob (2015) explains that social reproduction refers to “the emphasis on the structures and activities that transmit social inequality from one generation to the next.” The upper class has many advantages and will continue to receive them after the process of social reproduction – in this case, through the process of gentrification. Pierre Bourdieu (2018) famously indicates the four types of capital that form social reproduction: financial, cultural, human, and social capital. These are all interconnected to create a cycle of social inequality that will be passed on across generations (ibid). Bourdieu (2018, p. 257) further argued that “The specific role of the sociology of education is assumed once it has established itself as the science of the relations between cultural reproduction and social reproduction. This occurs when it endeavours to determine the contribution made by the educational system to the reproduction of the structure of power relationships and symbolic relationships between classes, by contributing to the reproduction of the structure of the distribution of cultural capital among these classes.” Smith’s study (2002) suggests that the process of gentrification has been generalised as an urban strategy of capital production, and the social reproduction of cities delivers certain kinds of capital to certain constituencies. Urban regeneration’s common social causes, Smith (2002) argues, often only succeeds in bringing back certain classes or groups of people. Social and economic restructuring is, at the same time, the restructuring of spatial scale, “insofar as the fixation of scales crystallises the contours of social power – who is empowered and who contained, who wins and who loses – into remade physical landscape” (Brenner, 1998; Smith and Dennis, 1987; Swyngedouw, 1996, 1997, cited in Smith, 2002, p.435).

In George Town’s case, the urban regeneration of the inner-city area demands an attentiveness to social reproduction. Many residents move to the city periphery and newly developed areas, retaining their old homes in the inner city as temporary ‘rentals’ or holidays homes. The inner-city area has been socially hollowed out, often by residents themselves, and where the cultural determinants of the place are defined by visitors. Thus, the cultural fabric of the area dissipates. Kahn (1997) argues that both governmental and non-governmental groups have played a part in influencing George Town’s urban evolution: apart from the George Town Grants Programmes from Think City, George Town Festival by the collaboration of the state government, Penang Global Tourism, and George Town World Heritage Incorporated are also significant to the cultural fabric of George Town’s inner city. The inner city, which was the area of the indigenous working-class Penangites, has been reproduced to share, mostly, the arts and culture of the middle and upper-class visitors and peripheral residents. This is, therefore, how the social reproduction in George Town emerged through urban regeneration, gentrification, stimulated in part at least by the Creative City.

The second consequence is the disintegrating developments of the city that ultimately leads to the loss of social diversity and a capitalist trap. In George Town, the nomination of the UNESCO World Heritage Site status provoked many development schemes in the city. To gain and maintain the status, the state and federal governments have engaged in development according to the UNESCO three Outstanding Universal Values – (i) “an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape” which illustrates a significant stage in human history, (ii) the “exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilisation which is living,” and (iii) the site exhibits “an important interchange of human values over a span of time” (Think City, 2013). For the George Town built environment, to be sustainably conserved and maintained, the economically viability of the scheme is internally related to building occupancy and financial
returns. The increasing complexity and expense of professional heritage architectural conservation also faces the challenge in representing the complexity of the country’s multicultural social balance: it has been argued that indigenous Malaysian culture is over-represented in the approach to building design and articulation (Kahn, 1997). This entails the question of social diversity, diversity of class and race.

In addition, the disintegrating developments also lure the Penangites to fall into the trap of capitalism when tourism and visitors define the strategic economic priorities of the city. In the case of George Town, the whole inner-city planning is defined as a tourist destination (Kahn, 1997). The George Town Action Plan 2013 began with the waterfront area, Chew Jetty, with a rationale of ‘returning the waterfront to the people’; however, the social dimension of the design (in terms of creative milieu, or lack of) belied the fact that the constituency of the capital generated was, in fact, visitors. The jetty is largely articulated by shops. The cultural dynamics have shifted to a job-oriented service-based industry of earn-and-spend. To conclude, the Creative City discourse in Penang and other projects did not have a determining impact but combined with existing priorities and strategic planning. Rather, it supplied a motive for co-opting development ‘techniques’ that visually have a cultural dimension, but whose rationale and outcomes and service-based economic capital. The city facilitates a form of social reproduction that at once disintegrates (in Bourdieu’s terms) cultural and human development and increases financial and social capital.

**Conclusion**

In this article, four cases along with four major issues pertaining to the cultural politics of creative cities in Southeast Asia have been discussed – these were, participation in Chiang Mai, representation in Bandung, inter-local policy transfer in Cebu, and social diversity in George Town. Our discussions were framed by brief reference to the Creative City discourse (Landry, Florida, and Howkins) so as to indicate how a lack of theorisation of the policy process has allowed the Creative City discourse to be used in other non-cultural frameworks of urban planning, economy and enterprise management. Indeed, the open-ended character of Creative City ideas allow it to be appropriated by planning rationales quite hostile to the cultural priorities of the Creative City discourse thinkers themselves. It is the contention of this article that Creative City discourse is playing a role in facilitating neoliberalism in these cities. This role is not decisive nor determinative, but suggests that how the Creative City has been defined allows it a compliance with neoliberal logics of change, development, capital and social reproduction. This suggests that the Creative City, given its now-global influence, requires a theoretical re-invention, inserting the original social, public and cultural priorities, and devising policy models by which implementation can take place without the compromises to neoliberalism witnessed in our four case studies.

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